Honeypots
Deception layer: assets that should never be accessed in normal operation. Touching them indicates compromise or prompt-driven exfiltration.
Types
| Type | Trigger |
|---|---|
| API key honeypots | Authorization header or tool param matches a decoy key |
| File path honeypots | file-read / file-write targets a monitored path |
Management
Honeypots are stored per instance_id. Create via Honeypots API:
POST /api/honeypotswithtype: api_keyandkeyType: openai | anthropic | deepseekPOST /api/honeypotswithtype: file_pathand path pattern
List: GET /api/honeypots?instance_id=carina-prod.
Agent checks
Carina calls:
POST /api/honeypots/check/keybefore HTTP requests with keysPOST /api/honeypots/check/pathbefore file tools
On match, Scout logs breach severity and Carina returns access denied to the model.
Use cases
- Plant a fake
sk-...key in a repo; any use in the agent triggers an alert. - Monitor
~/.ssh/id_rsaorsecrets/production.envpaths that the agent should never read.
Alerts
Breaches dispatch through configured Telegram, Slack, and email adapters immediately.